Techno-nationalism is now the critical battlefront in geopolitics

Prof. Syed Munir Khasru

South China Morning Post
September 03, 2025

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3323778/techno-nationalism-now-critical-battlefront-geopolitics

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The revival of techno-nationalism is reshaping strategies across continents. The European Union has embraced technological sovereignty with the EU Chips Act and investments in artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technology. Japan and South Korea are diversifying supply chains and boosting domestic capacity. India is positioning itself as an alternative hub through the Make in India and Digital India initiatives, aimed at reducing reliance on both China and the West.

Export controls, industrial policy and regulatory power are the instruments of geopolitics today. The assumption that technology is a neutral force driving shared progress is giving way to a new reality: technology is becoming a front line of national strategy.

In a multipolar technological landscape, cooperation coexists uneasily with decoupling and rivalry. For instance, the United States has imposed restrictions on advanced chip exports while China, in turn, has tightened export controls on the critical minerals that are needed in hi-tech products.

The Chips and Science Act, promotion of Open Radio Access Network (Open-RAN) standards as an alternative to 5G technology and AI Action Plan in the US reflect a strategy of combining public investment with alliance-building – such as the so-called Chip 4 Alliance with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan – to maintain primacy while blocking rivals like China from cutting-edge technologies.

China has doubled down on indigenous innovation, pouring state funds into semiconductors and AI while promoting its “digital silk road” abroad. President Xi Jinping’s call for “self-reliance” is basically a call for the country to leapfrog in 6G and quantum technologies, setting global standards aligned with its ecosystem.

Japan, not backing down, is investing big in 2-nanometre chip fabrication through the state-backed joint venture Rapidus. Last year, South Korea announced a US$19 billion support package for its chip businesses, citing a need to keep up in areas like chip design and contract manufacturing amid “all-out national warfare” in the semiconductor market. Last month, India approved four more semiconductor manufacturing projects, taking the total under the India Semiconductor Mission, launched in 2021, to 10.

Europe has its EU Chips Act, Gaia-X data infrastructure initiative and AI Act. It has also banned Chinese telecoms gear for security reasons. India also blends protectionist measures with global partnerships under its Atmanirbhar Bharat agenda for self-reliance. Still, initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission imply a desire to integrate with global democratic supply chains alongside the safeguarding of sovereignty.

Increasingly, the tech struggle revolves around who sets the global rules. China has been especially systematic in this area, launching its China Standards 2035 plan to ensure its companies are making products that shape the technical foundations of emerging technologies.

Huawei Technologies already leads in contributions to 5G standards, while Chinese representation has grown in international bodies such as the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Last year, several Chinese 6G standards were approved by ITU, the UN organisation for digital technologies.

This growing presence has unsettled the US and Europe, historically the standard setters with the power to influence international markets and lock in long-term advantages.

Different countries have responded in different ways. The EU created its toolbox for 5G security, urging members to phase out high-risk vendors such as Huawei and ZTE. Germany has pledged to remove Huawei equipment only by 2029, a lack of haste that some feel could complicate Nato’s security coordination. In comparison, Britain, for instance, has taken a tougher line, banning Huawei outright and enforcing a 2027 removal deadline.

In the Asia-Pacific, Australia was one of the first to exclude Huawei back in 2018, later adding a framework to review foreign tech vendors, while Japan and South Korea have been more cautious in their approach, often balancing economic cooperation with China with the need to safeguard critical infrastructure.

It is a little different in Southeast Asia as countries such as Malaysia continue to accept Chinese suppliers because of cost advantages. These examples depict how the global contest over standards is as much about political choices and alliances as it is about technical specifications, with each country weighing security risks against economic realities.

Western countries are beginning to realise that the contest over technical standards is a core front in the struggle for technological leadership, rather than a side issue. That efforts are being made to design trusted supplier networks and strengthen security reviews is suggestive of how the West is laying out alternatives to reliance on Chinese vendors.

China’s technological influence is pushing some democratic allies to work more closely together to prevent fragmentation and ensure their voices carry weight. While these steps do not guarantee long-term dominance, they show that standards are now viewed as a battleground where values, economics and security intersect.